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Abstract.
Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has witnessed a flourishing of diverse forms of external
intervention and interference, including humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect
(RtoP) missions. Indeed, interventions have become a structural characteristic of today’s global
politics as have the various challenges associated with these interventions. In spite of the pitfalls,
Africa will likely witness more interventions. As evidence has shown from Libya, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire,
as well as in other ongoing cases, highlights, RtoP interventions remain entangled between solving
the problems of those conceptualized as beneficiaries and those conceptualized as targets. While
there is a need to rethink the application of the RtoP, in general, it is imperative we reconsider what
occurs during encounters between interveners and those intervened upon. Determining the success
or failure of RtoP will remains partial until intervening nations take into account the role of local
dynamics and varying cultural contexts, which inform social action, as well as the power relations
between interveners and those intervened upon.
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Introduction
Scholars have argued there is increasing concern from the international community concerning 
its response to various humanitarian catastrophes that threaten humanity.1 Yet, violent conflicts 
in developing countries and, particularly in Africa have led to the death of thousands of civilians. 
Nearly 600,000 civilians in twenty-seven African countries have been massacred in the past two 
decades, while tens of millions more have been displaced, killed in battles, or perished from the 
indirect causes of such attacks and armed conflicts.2 It is within this context that the Responsibility 
to Protect (RtoP) resonated as a necessary framework to respond to the problematic challenges 
of the twenty-first century. However, just like its forerunners, RtoP has generated much debate 
among states, policymakers, and even International Relations scholars. 
On one hand, scholars such as Teson, Wheeler, Weiss, Arbour, Bellamy and Luck,3 have 
declared support for RtoP, as a moral framework, to respond to humanitarian catastrophes. On the 
other hand, scholars such as Mandani, Chandler, Branch, and Wai4 view RtoP with great suspicion, 
while submitting the doctrine seeks to bypass state sovereignty in justification of humanitarian 
intervention.
Since its adoption, RtoP has been applied in Kenya, South Sudan, Libya, Mali, and Cote d’Ivoire, 
as well as in other ongoing cases. While the doctrine remains largely contested, the nature of 
conflict with grave consequences for humanity justifies the continuous application of the doctrine. 
However, the practice of the RtoP doctrine has not escaped seemingly persistent questions of who, 
why, when, and how interventions should be carried out in the affairs of another state by a state or 
group of states. This article seeks to explore the glaring and inescapable challenges associated with 
the doctrine within the ambits of the use of force as articulated in Pillar three of RtoP. It interrogates 
those cases where RtoP has been invoked in Africa, the emerging challenges of those interventions 
on the humanitarian intervention discourse, and the future of the RtoP doctrine. It is argued that 
the use of military force to protect civilians in conflict situation remains shrouded in controversy 
and unpredictable consequences. This is evident in the way and manner the Libyan, Mali and Cote 
d’Ivoire interventions played out. In essence, these interventions lead to the death of more lives 
than expected, which contradicts the fundamental argument used to justify many interventions: to 
protect civilian life. 
Notably, the Libyan debacle only serves to underscore how the NATO led intervention was 
not only used as a fig leaf for Western powers, but also led to greater violations of human rights 
as well as the death of thousands of civilians.5 While it may seem the reviewed cases of the RtoP 
in Africa have generated a series of criticisms, the need to protect civilians remains persistently 
compelling. Hence, it is critical to monitor future interventions to ameliorate the operational 
challenges associated with their practice, emphasize the role of local dynamics when contemplating 
interventions, as well as consider the power relations between interveners and those intervened 
upon before authorizing intervention under the auspice of the RtoP doctrine. More importantly, 
efforts should be geared towards soft power diplomacy such as preventive diplomacy, negotiations, 
initiating and supporting peace agreements, and greater investment channeled into building peace 
through infrastructural development.
Theoretical Considerations
The protection of civilians and civilian populations in armed conflict remains a cornerstone 
of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Among other roles, IHL seeks to set and monitor the 
expected duties, obligations or rules of engagements that guide parties to a conflict. Though early 
experiences of war assumed an interstate dimension, the period after the cold war witnessed a 
flourishing of intrastate conflict, which had a significant impact on the civilian populations. Since 
5 Douglas Irvin-Erickson, “Protection from Whom? Tensions, Contradictions, and Potential in the Responsibility to 
Protect,” in Rethinking Security in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Edwin Daniel Jacobs (London: Palgrave, 2016), 106.
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then, the international community has engaged in different forms of activities aimed at protecting 
civilian populations. In practice, this has included the wide range of consensual and non-
consensual activities embarked upon by the international community to protect civilians outside 
the contexts of armed conflict.6 Within this context, Williams lists five reasons why the need to 
protect civilians remains vital in Africa.7 First, the wider implications in terms of human cost as a 
result of armed conflicts; second, the consistent nature of various United Nations Security Council 
resolutions to protect civilians in armed conflict situations; third, the understanding that failed 
or collapsed peace deals greatly impact governance structures; fourth, the necessity to protect 
civilians from atrocity crimes as stipulated in the RtoP doctrine; and fifth, the belief that civilian 
protection remains a sine qua non to addressing the security and development challenges facing 
Africa. Undoubtedly, these persistent and protracted conflicts witnessed in and around Africa 
provoke both local and international concerns. It is within this context the global RtoP doctrine 
resonated. Since its adoption, however, the doctrine has been confronted with a series of criticisms 
and counter criticisms. 
For instance, in separate studies, Alex Bellamy sought to explore the context of its adoption, the 
intricacies surrounding the doctrine, and its positive or negative impact on the instutionalization 
of the RtoP doctrine five years after its establishment.8 For Bellamy, while the doctrine has been 
successfully applied by the various United Nations Security Council resolutions, RtoP remains 
enmeshed in conceptual ambiguity and abuse. Though these interventions have led to moral 
hazards, evidence abound suggests the doctrine remains vital for the prevention of atrocity crimes 
in conflict situations. Similarly, Gareth Evans draws our attention to what he considers as attacks 
on the RtoP due to misconception and misinformation. In particular, Evans frowns upon narrow 
comparisons between RtoP and humanitarian intervention. While humanitarian intervention 
emphasizes the use of force, for Evans, RtoP promotes a wide range of activities aimed at civilian 
protection, and force should always be considered as a last option. Moreover, for Evans RtoP marks 
a conceptual victory in the protection discourse in and around Africa.9 Elsewhere, Tim Murithi 
pays critical attention to the emergence of RtoP and the extent to which the African Union (AU) 
- through its Constitutive Act - has sought to complement the R2P doctrine. Murithi notes that 
the expanding gatekeeping role played by the AU in a series of RtoP interventions in such places 
as Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia, and points to the fact that the AU is committed to global peace. 
Despite this commitment, the AU seems to be confronted with both operational and institutional 
challenges, which have hampered its quest for peace throughout the continent. Therefore, to bolster 
RtoP, there is an urgent need for Africa leaders to reorient themselves toward their understanding 
of the doctrine, their disposition to conflict, and conceptualizing new avenues to address armed 
conflict.10
There is little doubt these emergent challenges and the need to protect civilians from violence 
opens a new chapter in the humanitarian discourse in and around Africa. To that end, Martha 
Finnemore has examined the changes over why Western countries continue to devote resources 
to conflicts in Africa, and the causes, nature, and consequences of these conflicts. Finemmore 
concludes humanitarian intervention is not a new phenomenon in Africa. Rather, what seems 
confusing and controversial is the perception of the justification for the use of force for the 
6 Cristina C. Carmen, “Protecting Civilians in Armed Conflict: International Framework and Challenges,” European 
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) Briefing, 2016, 2, accessed January 12, 2017, Http//www.europa.eu/thinktank/en/
document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)573917.
7 Williams, Enhancing Civilian Protection, 5-6.
8 Bellamy, Five Years On, 166; Alex J. Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: from Words to Deeds (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2011), 24.
9 Gareth Evans, “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Lessons and Challenges,” (Alice Tay Lecture on Law and 
Human Rights, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, May 5, 2011), accessed January 12, 2017, http://
www.gevans.org/speeches/speech437.html.
10 Tim Murithi, “The Responsibility to Protect, as Enshrined in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union,” 
African Security Review 16, no. 3 (September 2007), 20-24.
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purpose of civilian protection.11 For Anne Orford, scholars, experts, and practitioners who throw 
their weight behind liberal Western interventionism ignore the imperial motives of such external 
interventions. This has been made worse by the false understanding among Western nations of 
the potency of international institutions and the ability of human rights advocacy groups to rally 
around the victims of atrocity crimes. Orford concludes these interventions, regardless of how they 
are conceived, remain shrouded in the long running adventurism of Western nations in relation to 
power and politics.12
Focusing on the RtoP intervention in Libya, Mathias Dembinski and Theresa Reinold observe 
how the RtoP intervention has led to mixed reactions. First, criticisms against the AU for its inability 
to adopt a proactive stance towards the Libyan conflict in the face of glaring and continuous 
atrocity crimes against the civilian population. On the other hand, the apparent misunderstanding 
and subsequent misinterpretation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 by 
NATO not only led to the killings of more civilians, but also the eventual ousting and death of 
Ghaddaffi. Undoubtedly, the inability of the international community to effectively monitor the 
Resolution 1970 before pronouncing Resolution 1973 has raised some suspicions about liberal 
western interventionism.13 Thus, for them, the Libyan intervention raised a critical challenge of who 
should be saddled with the responsibility of carrying the burden of civilian protection in conflict 
situations. While this question remains unresolved, African nations will continue to raise their 
suspicion about the practice and objective of RtoP, particularly when it is executed by a coalition of 
willing (Western) states. This, for them, has the potential to undermine both the global consensus 
surrounding the RtoP doctrine and its chances for future use.14
Drawing from the Libyan experience, Roland Paris itemizes some of the consequences of the 
intervention into what he refers to as five structural problems: Mixed motives, counter factualness, 
conspicuous harm, end state crisis, and the problem of inconsistency. Mixed motive problems: 
Though the sole aim of humanitarian intervention is to save lives, various cases have suggested 
otherwise. Military intervention in armed conflict situations has been conducted based on economic 
and geopolitics calculations and these calculations are premised on the grounds that the very idea 
of establishing RtoP resonates largely around self-interest. The Counterfactual Problem: One of the 
difficulties in civilian protection is the puzzle of measuring the extent to which an intervention can 
be judged successful. When compared to other types of military engagement or operations and, 
particularly those carried out with the aim to capture territories, defeat or disarm opposing forces, 
and counterinsurgency, the chances of success of humanitarian intervention remains relatively low 
(Paris 2014). The Conspicuous Harm Problem: In this case, it has become increasingly clear that 
no matter how well planned, military operations are associated with collateral damage. Though 
associated with many military operations this harm is felt more with military operations that 
base their legality on the strict belief of preventing harm (Paris 2014). Such was the case with the 
NATO intervention in Libya. The indiscriminate aerial bombardment of Libya led to the death of 
civilians. The End State Problem: Noble as the intention of intervening countries may be, ensuring 
that civilians in protected areas remain safe withdrawal has often been a problem in conflict zones. 
On the other, the issue of persistent political instability, lack of coordination, and relapsing into 
conflict in the state intervened upon and neighboring states remain additional issues of the end state 
problem. Problem of Inconsistency:  Intervening in conflict situations has been largely inconsistent, 
and at most times depends on the interests of intervening states. The problem of balancing moral 
authority and adhering to the procedures of intervention has further increased the tension of 
11 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003), 134-135.
12 Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention, 20.
13 Spencer Zifcak, “The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 13, no. 1 
(2012), 8; Mohammed Nauruzzmaan, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Retrieved in Libya, Buried in Syria,” 
Insight Turkey 15, no. 2 (2013), 63; Murithi, Enshrined in Article 4, 20-24.
14 Matthias Dembinski and Theresa Reinold, “Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect – African and 
European Perspectives,” PRIF report, no. 107 (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2011), 24, accessed 
January 18, 2019, https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif107.pdf. 
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inconsistency.  Though inaction in the face of atrocity crimes discredits RtoP, the indiscriminate use 
of military force underscores the seeming inconsistency in responses to armed conflict. For Paris, 
the emergence of the aforementioned problems in the Libyan intervention further deepened the 
negatively perceived push for liberal Western interventionism, sovereignty, and the human rights 
protection dilemma. Hence, the application and consequent failure of RtoP in this case point to the 
fundamental flaws that remain with the doctrine and its expected benefits. As such, rather than the 
failures of the RtoP addressing future interventions, Paris concludes that such cases will only serve 
to expose RtoP.15 Furthermore, some critical scholars have focused more on the proliferation of 
interventions in Africa and their consequences for the continent and global security. Zubarui Wai 
remains prominent among this set of scholars. For Way, though interventions in Africa qualify the 
just cause criteria, the way and manner the RtoP doctrine has been used differs sharply from what 
the doctrine was actually fashioned to address. This argument is premised on the outcomes of both 
the Libyan and the Mali intervention respectively. Thus, noble as the intentions of the intervening 
countries may have been, the main idea behind this humanitarian upsurge remains nothing but 
economic imperialism clothed in humanitarian intentions. Moreover the global war on terror has 
equally provided a golden opportunity for Western imperialists to advance their economic pursuits 
violently. Wai concludes that more worrisome is the fact that apart from the Libyan and Mali 
interventions, Cote d’Ivoire, Central African Republic have the trappings of Western adventurism 
as a disguise for human rights protection.16
On the contrary, counter restrictionists, experts, and advocates of the RtoP doctrine have argued 
that the Libyan intervention marks a defining moment for the doctrine. Though the use of force, as 
experienced in Libya was not generally consisted with the pronouncements of the United Nations 
Security Council, the international community needs to make sure that whenever interventions 
are authorized, it must strictly focus strictly on civilian protection.17 Consequently, by reassessing 
the interventions in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, Thakur argues RtoP underscores the need to balance 
state sovereignty and human rights protection, the dilemma between interests and values, as well 
as striking a balance between unilateral interferences and instutionalized indifference in conflict 
situations. He concludes that the RtoP doctrine remains beneficial to intervening states as well 
as those intervened upon. The doctrine comes with assurances of due process, which stipulates 
how, when, and who should carry out interventions for civilian protection.18 On a similar note, 
Francesco Francioni and Christine Bakker argue the international intervention in Libya and Mali 
implies Western countries have demonstrated their preparedness to avoid the mistakes of Rwanda. 
This, for them, is further demonstrated in the leadership position the United States has assumed 
in these interventions.19 Though Western countries have been at the forefront of the propagation of 
RtoP, many African countries have continued to throw their weight behind the doctrine. Therefore, 
in drumming up support for the doctrine, Jeremy Sarkin20 examines the milestones that have been 
achieved and the extent to which R2P has received wide or mass support. For Sarkin, while human 
rights violations persist, sovereignty and issues of non-interference remain a stumbling block to 
addressing this dilemma. However, the ugly events witnessed in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries suggested the need for a framework for the protection of civilians. Such led to the process 
and final adoption of the RtoP doctrine, which was expected to put the duty of protection at the 
door steps of the states and the inevitably of the international community to intervene should 
15 Roland Paris, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention,” 
International Peacekeeping 21, no. 5 (October 2014), 572- 578.
16 Wai, The Empire’s New Clothes, 494- 495.
17 Ramesh Thakur, “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Between Opportunistic Humanitarianism and Value-Free 
Pragmatism,” Security Challenges 7, no. 4 (2011), 24- 25.
18 Ibid.
19 Francesco Francioni and Christine Bakker, “Responsibility to Protect, Humanitarian Intervention and Human Rights: 
Lessons from Libya to Mali,” Transworld, Working paper no. 15 (April 2013), accessed January 18, 2019, http://www.
iai.it/sites/default/files/TW_WP_15.pdf.
20 Jeremy Sarkin, “The Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention in Africa,” Global Responsibility to Protect 2, 
no. 4 (2010), 387.
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states fail. The major problem of the RtoP is that, as compared to other international frameworks 
that are situated within the ambits of international law, the doctrine remains a norm. This has 
made to the doctrine vulnerable to diverse interpretations, criticisms and counter criticisms.
Historicizing RtoP and its Practice in Africa
Building on Francis Deng and colleagues’ thesis on sovereignty as responsibility,21 and the 
shameless inaction of the international community in the Kosovo and Rwanda, Kofi Annan, former 
UN Secretary-General, challenged world leaders on the need for proactive steps concerning the 
protection of civilians. The ideal RtoP would be of great importance to the international community, 
as a human rights framework, was first articulated by Kofi Annan. He believed RtoP had the potential 
to resolve the broader justice and human rights protection conundrum. For Anna, this objective 
had merit over his earlier thought of creating consensus around state sovereignty and individual 
sovereignty.22 Precisely, RtoP challenges the normative Westphalia approach to sovereignty by 
attempting to reconceptualize sovereignty from being a right of states to a responsibility of states. 
Conceived as such, this responsibility can be withdrawn from the moment a state reneges on its 
obligation to protect its citizens. Furthermore, the doctrine empowers the international community 
to sideline state sovereignty in a bid to protect civilian populations from war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This might also include the use of military force 
if need be.23 After much deliberation, parley, consultation, and consideration among world leaders 
and practitioners, experts, and concerned states, the International Commission for Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released a report in 2001 on RtoP. The report aimed to redirect the 
focus on intervention from a “right to intervene” to “a responsibility” and a new understanding of 
sovereignty. Central to RtoP is the manifest role of states in the protection of its citizens from war 
crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing crime against humanity, and the international community’s role 
should a state fail. Accordingly, the ICISS identified three fundamental components of the RtoP 
doctrine: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild.
A. The responsibility to prevent: Within this component, the doctrine stipulates that to 
address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises 
putting populations at risk, preventive measures must be put in place.
B. The responsibility to react: In violent situations, there must be an adequate response 
in situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include 
coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military 
intervention.
C. The responsibility to rebuild: RtoP equally emphasized the need for post-engagement 
obligations, and these may include full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and 
reconciliation, and addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt 
or avert.24
21 Francis M. Deng, Sadikel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman. eds., Sovereignty as 
Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 33.
22 Gareth Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect” Wisconsin International Law Journal 24, no. 
3 (2006), 708- 709.
23 Alan J. Kuperman, “Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect,” The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International 
Relations 33, no. 4 (2009), 19.
24 Greg Puley, “The Responsibility to Protect: East, West, and Southern African Perspectives on Preventing and 
Responding to Humanitarian Crises,” Working paper no. 05-5 (Ontario: Africa Peace Forum, African Women’s 
Development and Communication Network, Africa Institute of South Africa, and Project Ploughshares, 2005), 12, 
accessed January 18, 2019, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/ploughshares.pdf.
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Furthermore, the ICISS listed some precautions or conditions that must be met before 
contemplating intervention in a conflict situation.25 This included: just cause, right intention, 
proportional means, reasonable prospects and last resort.
 9 Just Cause: Intervention can be justified when there is an immediate or actual threat to 
civilians, and this includes killing, forcible expulsion, acts of terror, large scale violation 
of rights.
 9 Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human 
suffering.
 9 Proportional means: Within principle, the scale, duration, and intensity of the planned 
military intervention should be at best the minimum required to secure the defined 
human protection objective.
 9 Reasonable prospects: Whenever interventions are contemplated, there must be a 
reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering that with which the 
consequences of action is not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.
 9  Last resort: The use of military force is only justifiable when it is apparent that other 
non-military options for the mediation, prevention, or peaceful resolution of the crisis 
have been explored. 
Since RtoP was adopted, there have been a series of attempts to institutionalize the doctrine at 
the international, regional, and sub-regional levels respectively. Unlike humanitarian intervention, 
Ramesh Thakur posits the ICISS argued RtoP would put the needs and interests of the victims of 
atrocities ahead of intervening powers.26 It is a victim and people centered, while humanitarian 
intervention privileges the perspectives, preferences, and priorities of the intervening states. Since 
the initiation of the doctrine, it has generated a heated debate among scholars and practitioners. 
For scholars such as Evans and Bellamy, the RtoP doctrine is not only timely, but it also goes 
a long way in addressing the long-standing problem of humanitarian catastrophes.27 While for 
others, including Mandani, Branch, and Kuperman, the RtoP doctrne negates the norm of non-
intervention, the prohibition on the use of force, and RtoP plainly remains nothing but a smoke 
screen for Western imperialism disguised by a humanitarian pretext.28 While other have argued 
that in spite of the challenges of RtoP, the doctrine is here to stay.29
Libya and the 2011 Uprising
The Arab spring that led to a series of protest in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain amongst 
others, spread to Libya on February 15, 2011. On February 16, 2011 a group of lawyers staged 
a peaceful protest in the front of the North Benghazi Court calling for political and democratic 
reforms. Following the initial, minor, and peaceful protest against the Ghaddaffi regime, a violent 
crowd set ablaze three police stations, the headquarters of the internal security force, and the public 
attorney’s office. In the cities of Al- Baida and Benghazi, police stations and security headquarters 
25 Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (Nov – Dec 2002), 99- 
110. DOI: 10.2307/20033347
26 Ramesh Thakur, “Emerging Powers and the Responsibility to Protect after Libya,” NUPI, Policy Brief no. 15 (Oslo: 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, January 2012), 1- 4, accessed December 18, 2018, https://brage.bibsys.no/
xmlui/handle/11250/224065.
27 Gareth Evans, “The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone?,” International Relations 22, no. 
3 (2008), 285; Bellamy, Five Years On, 143- 144.
28 Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, 25-29; Adam Branch, Irresponsibility, 109; Alan J. Kuperman, “False Pretense for War in 
Libya?,” The Boston Globe, April 14, 2011, accessed January 12, 2017, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_ 
opinion/opedi/articles/2011/04/14/false_ pretense_for_war_in_libya.
29 Gareth Evans, “The Consequences of Syria: Does the Responsibility to Protect Have a Future?,” E- International Relations, 
2014, accessed January 18, 2019, https://www.e-ir.info/2014/01/27/the-consequences-of-non-intervention-in-syria-does-
the-responsibility-to-protect-have-a-future/.
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were also attacked.30 Thereafter, a series of protests continued, calling for the resignation of 
Ghaddaffi, and began to take on a violent dimension. A furious Ghaddaffi showed no sign of 
giving into the activities of the protesting civilians. Instead, he ordered his security forces to go 
after those he termed “criminals,” influenced by western conspirators to overthrow him.  From 
that point, the uprising, which had begun peacefully, turned violent as a result of Gadhafi’s brutal 
response to the protesters.31
An obstinate Ghaddaffi not only threatened to deal with the protestors, but called them “rats 
and cockroaches,” while threatening to go house by house sniffing them out. In what looked like 
wording similar to that used in Rwanda, Bellamy and Williams argue that in words that bore 
resemblance to the Rwanda genocide of 1994, Ghaddaffi told the world how his security officers 
would deployed throughout the country to purify the surrounding towns from the cockroaches 
and Libyan rebels who took up arms against the regime.32 Upon hearing this, the international 
community passed United Nations Security Council resolution 1970 in reference to Libya in a 
bid to pacify the Ghaddaffi’s regime. Not satisfied with the situation in Libya and, particularly 
regarding allegations of further clamp downs on civilians by the Ghaddaffi regime, and the plan to 
take over Benghazi, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1973, which authorized 
the use of every means necessary to protect civilians. Resolution 1973 began with a call for “the 
immediate establishment of a ceasefire.” It reiterated “the responsibility of the Libyan authorities 
to protect the Libyan population” and reaffirmed that “parties to armed conflicts bear the primary 
responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians.” The resolution 
authorized UN Member States “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas” of Libya.33 
However, as Cohn points out with respect to the Libyan intervention, the military force 
exceeded the bounds of the “all necessary measures” authorization.34 “All necessary measures” 
should have first comprised peaceful measures to settle the conflict. Yet, peaceful means were 
not exhausted before the military invasion began. A high level international team – consisting 
of representatives from the Arab League, the African Union, and the UN Secretary General – 
should have been dispatched to Tripoli in an attempt to negotiate a real cease-fire, and establish a 
mechanism for elections and for protecting civilians. Moreover, after the passage of the resolution, 
Libya immediately offered to accept international monitors and Ghaddaffi offered to step down 
and leave Libya, but the demonization of Ghaddaffi meant the offers were immediately rejected by 
the opposition and the international community. 
Ultimately, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) led intervention not only threw 
up emerging challenges for the RtoP doctrine, the ousting and eventual killing of Ghaddaffi led to 
more criticism of the doctrine. The RtoP consensus underpinning Resolution 1973 was damaged 
by gaps in expectation, communication, and accountability between those who mandated the 
operation and those who executed it.35 Indeed, the effects of the Libya intervention continue to act 
as a barrier to the future application of RtoP especially in Syria where millions of civilians have 
been killed.
30 S. Awan, “The Libya Conspiracy: A Definitive Guide to the Lies of the Libya ‘Intervention’ and the Crime of the 
Century,” interview by William Ramsey, William Ramsey Investigates, January 28, 2017, accessed January 18, 2019, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gCySEiOdUEk.
31 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The New Politics of Protection: Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to 
Protect,” International Affairs 87, no. 4 (2011), 838. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01006.x
32 Ibid., 838.
33 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973, adopted March 17, 2011, (UN Doc. S/RES/1973), accessed December 
15, 2018, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya S 
RES 1973.pdf.
34 Marjorie Cohn, “The Responsibility to Protect – The Cases of Libya and Ivory Coast,” Global Research: Centre for 
Research on Globalization (May 2011), accessed March 22, 2017, http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-responsibility-to-
protect-the-cases-of-libya-and-ivory-coast/24799.
35 Thakur, Emerging Powers, 4.
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2011 Post Election Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire
Ethnic and political tensions in Cote d’Ivoire facilitated the outbreak of electoral violence 
between the period 2010- 2011, posing a risk to populations throughout the country. The conflict 
in Cote d’Ivoire emerged due to the disputed results of a long postponed presidential election 
on November 28, 2010. As a result, there were clashes between the supporters of the incumbent 
President, Laurent Gbagbo, and the main opposition candidate, Alassane Quattara. Within days 
of Gbagbo claiming victory, there was a heavy military crackdown on civilians by security forces 
loyal to Gbagbo, leading to the death of several. This prompted the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations Secretary General to call for external actions to 
halt the senseless killings.36 Increasing violence in the country led to a series of Security Council 
resolutions, with resolution 1975 authorizing the use of all necessary means to protect civilians.37 
The RtoP experiment in Libya supported the Cote d’ Ivoire scenario. Resolution 1975 can be viewed 
in tandem with resolution 1973 in Libya. Both Security Council resolutions undoubtedly represents 
the international community’s willingness to authorize the use of force to protect civilians from 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, while also affirming the role 
of the national state to protect its citizens.38 Though the intervention remains timely, and to a large 
extent helped to avert further atrocities against civilians, it again raises the question about if RtoP 
should be used as a cover for regime change.
Mali and the Tuareg Rebellion of 2012
The roots of the Mali crisis can be found in a long history of marginalization and distrust among 
Bamako and the various tribes in Mali. In 2011, the flight of thousands of Tuaregs from Libya 
following the ousting of Ghaddaffi by the NATO forces gave rise to regional fears of a new Tuareg 
insurgency throughout Mali, Niger, and other countries within the Sahel region. Having fled Mali 
after long exclusion policies of successive Malian governments, the Tuarge rebels returned to Mali 
after the fall of Ghaddaffi, their main benefactor. In 2011, they joined with other former rebels to 
form a new force, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which claimed 
to be fighting for an independent state in the north. Unlike other conflicts that have taken place in 
Mali, the political and security crisis that erupted in 2012 undoubtedly took the world by surprise as 
the Tuareg rebels almost overran the entire country. Initially in early 2012, the rebellion in the north 
of the country was led by conventional local separatists who wanted to set up an independent state 
for the area’s native Saharan Tuareg people.39 In early 2012, the MNLA, supported by a nascent 
Tuareg-led Islamist group, Ansar al Deen, embarked on a series of attacks on the Malian military 
outposts. The challenges of elite corruption, mismanagement, and the deepening activities of the 
rebels that led to the capture of major towns throughout Mali not only demoralized the Malian 
troops, but also undermined their support for the Toure regime. Moreover the inability of the Toure 
regime to address these long held grievances eventually led to several Tuareg soldiers deserting 
the national army and joining MNLA.40 The Islamists hoped to take control of Mali in its entirety - 
not just the Tuareg north - and transform the country into a Islamic state. This internal crisis led to 
food shortage and greater insecurity in Mali and her neighboring countries.
Even though the crisis in Mali did not witness the urgent response such a conflict would herald, 
evidence abounds to suggest that both regional organizations and neighboring states responded 
in varying ways. Prominent among those who intervened was ECOWAS, which showed keen 
36 ECOWAS, “Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government on Cote d’Ivoire,” December 24, 
2010. Press release, no. 192/2010 (Abuja: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 2012), accessed 
December 10, 2018, http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=192&lang=en&annee=2010.
37 “Populations at Risk in Cote D’ Ivoire,” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, last modified December 15, 2012, 
accessed March 22, 2017, http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/ca_te_divoire.
38 Cohn, The Responsibility to Protect.
39 Yonah Alexander, “Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2012: Global Research and Implications,” (Arlington: 
International Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, February 2013), 10, accessed January 
19, 2019, http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/TerrorismNorthAfricaSahelGlobalReach.pdf.
40 Alexis Arieff, “Crisis in Mali,” CRS Report R42664 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 14, 2013), 
1-18, accessed January 20, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42664.pdf.
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interest in the worsening situation and condemned March coup in strong terms. It equally warned 
the military Junta of the consequences of not returning power to civilians, while also urging the 
MNLA rebel groups to lay down their arms without delay. Not satisfied with the process toward 
ensuring peace and stability returned to the country, ECOWAS further embarked on a series of 
steps aimed at persuading the various actors in the Mali conflict to work for peace. These included: 
economic and diplomatic sanctions, encouraging its members to close their borders to Mali. It 
was expected that these initiatives would force Mali to engage in a comprehensive peace process. 
ECOWAS, thus, choose not shut its door to a possible political solution to resolving the crisis. 
President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was selected as lead negotiator and an agreement was 
reached in April 2012 outlining a transition to civilian government under an interim president, 
parliamentary speaker, Dioncounda Traoré.41 ECOWAS was not alone in this intervention. The UN 
Security Council adopted a series of resolutions to bolster this intervention: Resolutions 2056 (July 
2012), 2071 (October 2012), and 2085 (December 2012). In resolution 2071, the Security Council 
declared its readiness to respond to the Mali crisis through a request for an international military 
force to assist the Malian army in recovering the key rebel held cities in the north. Consequently, 
the Security Council authorized the deployment of the proposed African-led International Support 
Mission to Mali (AFISMA) for an initial period of one year in Resolution 2085. Thereafter, it also 
called on its member states to effectively contribute troops to the international force and on regional 
and international organizations to provide training, equipment, and other logistical support to 
Mali.
Emerging Challenges of the Practice of the Responsibility to Protect in Africa
While the application of RtoP in Africa might have been hailed in some quarters to have saved 
civilians from “imminent attack,” particularly in Benghazi, the practice has, however, thrown up 
some challenges. These challenges have manifested themselves both in the decision-making and 
intervention processes and post-intervention periods. Evidently, while RtoP remains a noble idea 
that – at face value -seeks to protect civilians, its practice in a host of Africa countries has shown 
the doctrine tends to compound the problems it was designed to solve. The most counterintuitive 
aspect of RtoP is that it has contributes to the tragedies it intends to prevent. For instance, in spite 
of the international community assurances in Libya, the country is worse off today. As is evidently 
the case, neither the removal and nor the eventual killing of Ghaddaffi restored peace in Libya. The 
country is now largely characterized by social banditry, insurgency, sectionalism, and an almost 
total absence of a central authority.42 Libya is not alone in this characterization. Mali has also 
shown how deeply flawed external interventions can end. Today, the insurgency has increased 
tremendously with great consequences for people of Mali and its neighbors.
Even though mediation and prevention remain central to the RtoP doctrine, these instances 
suggest the aforementioned were not adequately employed. There is little doubt there has been 
a concentration on Pillar III- the use of force- by intervening states. This has ultimately led to the 
misuse, misapplication, and misinterpretation of security resolutions, particularly in Libya and 
Mali. A careful reading of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in Libya underscores how the 
use of force or eternal intervention was never explicit. Rather, it reminded the Libyan authorities 
of its duty to protect its citizens. For Loiselle and Morris, the most fundamental concern with UN 
Security Council resolution 1973 was the inclusion of only a suggestion of Pillar I of RtoP, and 
this was strictly about the responsibility of the Libyan state to protect its citizens from war crimes, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.43 Furthermore, Loiselle critically observes 
that the mere mentioning of the international community, as demonstrated in resolution 1973, does 
not in any way constitute an Opinio juris giving approval to the duty or role of the international 
41 ECOWAS, Final Communiqué, Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 
Nigeria, March 27, 2012. No. 083/2012, accessed January 22, 2017, http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.
php?nb=083&lang=en&annee=2012.
42 Kuperman, Rethinking, 22.
43 Maria-Eve Loiselle, “The Normative Status of the Responsibility to Protect After Libya,” Global Responsibility to Protect 5, 
no. 3 (2013), 341.
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community within the ambits of customary international law.44 Also, an African led mission was 
proposed for the intervention in Mali, however, as events turned out, the French led intervention 
held sway with the international community.
Furthermore, even though some scholars like Arbour, Welsh and Banda,45 have argued RtoP 
enjoys customary appeals, which grounds it in international law, the continuous condemnation 
and rejection of the doctrine shows that far from this being the case, RtoP is yet to be accommodated 
within international law. The subjective evaluation of humanitarian crises without any clear 
criterion has been established in international law, the subjective decision making on the type 
of human action to be adopted, and, in the worst case, unauthorized humanitarian intervention 
remains irreconcilable with the foundations of international law. Not only that, RtoP is still far 
from being rooted in international law. The way and manner in which interventions have been 
carried out without due regard for the basic rules of engagement also remains an outrage to 
international law. Interestingly, the four crimes – genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and ethnic cleansing- all of which are grounds the international community can use to authorize 
international action, have remained fluid and ambiguous. More so, RtoP -far from being a 
protective framework- has rather focused so much on civil conflicts without paying attention to 
other humanitarian challenges such as famine and poverty that also threaten human life. This has 
led to further criticisms of RtoP. For Shin-Wha, the problem of RtoP relates to its heavy emphasis 
on the protection of civilians in situations of violent conflict and its failure to properly address 
crises induced by extreme poverty and famine.46
At the decision-making level, RtoP has been confronted with the question of who has the 
authority to intervene and how should the intervention be carried out. Specifically, in the wake of 
the Libya crisis, the immediate problem that arose was not a problem of intervention, but rather how 
and who had the duty to intervene. This was made worse by the fact that the RtoP doctrine was not 
affirmative in terms of placing such a duty at the doorstep of a state; neither has the doctrine been 
able to resolve the ambiguity of RtoP as it concerns the four crimes upon which an intervention 
can be justified. Rather, the doctrine employs the term “international community” as those who 
can intervene should states fail to protect their citizens. The problem of who has the authority to 
intervene lingers from the cases of Libya, Mali, and Côté d’Ivoire, among others that are ongoing. In 
addition, though RtoP places regional organizations in a better position to carry out interventions, 
visible evidence suggests, at best, these regional bodies continue to play a mere gatekeeping role. 
Also, regional bodies, such as the Africa Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West Africa 
States (ECOWAS) have not lived up to expectations in terms of responding promptly to conflict 
situations. For instance, in Libya, the AU was deeply divided on how to respond, while in Mali, 
the response to the conflict was largely incoherent and haphazard. This ultimately led to setting 
aside an Africa led mission in favor of an internationally organized mission. The controversy 
surrounding the question of authority has remained one with no resolution in sight. Yet, more and 
more interventions have continued to be sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council with 
Africa nations playing little or no role in making vital decisions on issues around the continent. The 
absence of a unified method of arriving at how to apply the doctrine has led to misconceptions and 
the misinterpretation of various UN Security Council resolutions, especially in Libya. 
Reflecting on the conceptual ambiguity that has surrounded RtoP, Edward Luck argues that 
nine years after the doctrine was initiated by the International Commission for Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS), and five years after it was unanimously adopted in a World Summit 
Document of 2005, emerging issues such as; whether, where and how the RtoP has fared.47 Though 
he admits these emerging challenges emanate mainly from scholars who are unconvinced by the 
44 Ibid., 341.
45 Arbour, Duty Care, 445; Jennifer M. Welsh & Maria Banda, “International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: 
Clarifying or Expanding States’ Responsibilities?,”Global Responsibility to Protect 2, no. 2 (2010), 230.
46 Lee Shin-Wha,“The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in Humanitarian Emergencies: From Libya to North Korea?,” Asia 
Security Initiative, working paper no. 22 (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2012), 13.
47 Edward Luck, “The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early Promise?,” Ethics and International Affairs 24, no. 4 
(December 2010), 356.
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RtoP doctrine, Luck suggests RtoP is yet to demonstrate it possesses the ability to protect civilians 
from atrocity crimes.48 For this reason, Luck goes on to provide four caveats about the RtoP 
doctrine that remain fundamental: (1) it is be too early to makes assumptions about the future of 
RtoP, (2) the doctrine is still evolving, which means that some of the conceptual and operational 
challenges are still being considered by member states, (3) it is important to distinguish between 
RtoP as principle and RtoP as a guide, and (4) comparative case are essential to evaluate RtoP. Luck 
concludes there is need to avoid the conventional thinking of critics who once predicted a bleak 
future for human rights.49
Furthermore, in spite of assurances from World leaders as to the differentiation between RtoP 
and humanitarian intervention, the way in which RtoP has been applied, as an interventionist 
framework in armed conflict situations, suggests the doctrine remains nothing but a mere change 
in nomenclature. This has been made worse by the fact that while intervening states acknowledge 
the various principles enshrined in RtoP continue to place an emphasis on direct military action. 
For Stahn, even though RtoP may gradually replace the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, at 
present, many of the propositions as well as the practice of the concept remains largely uncertain 
from a normative point of view.50 The RtoP doctrine is, thus, in many ways still a political catchword 
rather than a legal norm, which will need further fine-tuning and commitment from states for it to 
develop into an organizing principle for international society. Particularly, even though resolution 
1970 passed, the international community did not allow the resolution to see the day of light before 
resolution 1973, which was used as a justification for the Libyan intervention. This was made 
possible through the demonization of Ghaddaffi. It is, therefore, not surprising Ghaddaffi’s offer 
of a ceasefire was not given any real consideration.
More importantly, the apparent and the unending question of when intervention is necessary, 
or how many civilians must be killed to provoke intervention, how do we quantify rights that are 
violated warranting external intervention, have remained a difficult task for the RtoP doctrine to 
achieve. Fascinatingly, since states have within their residual powers the ability to quell internal 
rebellion using a minimal level of force, the puzzling question of when, therefore, remains more 
controversial. Thus, the question that requires clarification at what point or how we measure 
the justification for intervention within the context of quelling internal rebellion to uphold law 
and fundamental rights. Looking at the nature of the protests and the characters involved in the 
Libya uprising, it would be difficult to arrive at the conclusion that those civilians Ghaddaffi 
clamped down on were helpless civilians. There was nothing about the situation in Libya that 
bared resemblance to civilians organizing mass protests given that none of the locations where 
the protests took place where typical protest locations in Libya. Instead, these confrontations 
took place at police stations, security offices, or military barracks, resulting in the taking of large 
amounts of weaponry.51 Hence, while it could be successfully argued that Ghaddaffi threatened 
to kill those protesting against him, what remains unclear is the existence of evidence suggesting 
an imminent massacre in Benghazi, which led to UN Security Council Resolution 1973. It must 
equally be observed that Libya is not alone in this problem, just as the case of Syria becomes more 
complicated with every passing year of conflict. In fact, the nature of the protests from their onset 
to date assumed a violent dimension and this accounted for the brutal response from the Assad 
regime. Hence, what was initially termed a public protest has gradually snowballed into a civil 
conflict. This has, therefore, created a dilemma for the international community regarding how to 
respond, if at all.
48 Luck, Growing Pains or Early Promise?, 366.
49 Edward Luck, “The Responsibility to Protect: The First Decade, Global Responsibility to Protect,” Global Responsibility to 
Protect 3, no. 4 (2011), 388-391.
50 Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?,” The American Journal of 
International Law 101, no. 1 (2007), 120.
51 Awan, The Libya Conspiracy. 
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Prospects for the Responsibility to Protect in Africa
Admittedly, the practice of RtoP in Africa has remained controversial and largely counterproductive. 
Yet, the need to protect civilians in conflict situations remains. This underscores the need to 
reevaluate the emerging challenges confronting the doctrine with a view of correcting the 
emerging challenges associated with its practice. Undoubtedly, the question of framing RtoP, as a 
concept and a human rights framework for the prevention of atrocity crimes, is long overdue and, 
particularly if the doctrine is to remain relevant for the protection of civilians. There is a need to 
situate RtoP properly within in the context of situations in which the doctrine is applied and vice 
versa. More specifically, the doctrine needs to extend to those humanitarian catastrophes that are 
not prevalent in political discourse. The act of framing the doctrine opens ground for shared space, 
as is becoming the generally accepted framework for responding to the protracted conflict and 
crimes against humanity.52
Secondly, if RtoP is to live up to its expectations, intervening countries must reassure the world 
that genuine step towards avoiding the past mistakes of Rwanda and Kosovo are being taken. 
While Libya suggests the international community was prompted to avoid such mistakes, similar 
conflict situations have proved otherwise. In other words, it is safe to argue the national interest 
of intervening states continues to influence their decisions to intervene in conflicts. Conflicts on 
the African continent in the wake of the Libyan crises as well as the long-protracted conflicts in 
Syria underscore that RtoP continues to be entangled; caught between responding to humanitarian 
needs and national interest. The international community must begin to demonstrate a real 
commitment towards addressing this problem through establishing or strengthening existing 
security frameworks such as early warning mechanisms, a panel of the wise, and the United Nations 
General Assembly to draw the attention of world leaders to cases of humanitarian catastrophe as 
well as how to respond.
Another area upon which the doctrine of RtoP could be improved is through critical reflection 
on the idea of “responsibility while protecting” (RWP), as championed by Brazil. The idea 
behind this concept is that, even if military intervention is a last resort, then those countries that 
intervene militarily under the doctrine of the RtoP should exercise proportionality and balance 
the consequences of their external interventions. This has become imperative, especially given the 
backlash in the wake of the Libyan intervention. Even though the guiding principles for intervention 
put forth by ICISS specify some of these criteria, adequate attention have not been paid to them 
and this has brought about post intervention challenges such as acute challenges associated with 
rebuilding. Specifically, there is a need to rethink, if not reconceptualize, the question of last resort 
in connection with external intervention and, particularly in light of prevention remaining vital to 
RtoP. The extent to which diplomacy, negotiations, and political settlement should be applied to 
conflicts in Africa must be purposeful.
Since the adoption of RtoP, civil society organizations have struggled with some important 
issues surrounding RtoP. They are concerned about the advantages, the disadvantages, and abuse 
of the doctrine. This has not only influenced the internalization of the doctrine, it has equally 
led to varied interpretations of UNSC mandates and implementation processes. More often, civil 
society organizations have only focused on the state under international scrutiny, while paying 
little attention to international actors and, particularly those intervening states. For instance, while 
civil society organizations played a crucial role in calling for intervention in Libya, they have, 
however, been mute on the question of the responsibility to rebuild societies where intervention 
has taken place. Positively, civil society needs to increase the rate at which they engage both with 
international and national governments, international and regional organizations, the media, and 
other relevant stakeholders to reach of the objectives of the duty to protect.
Evidently, from the application of RtoP in places such as Libya, Mali, and Côté d’Ivoire, 
intervening countries have - over time - continued to show a preference for military options despite 
prevention remaining key to RtoP. Preference must be given to non-military methods such as peace 
building, preventive diplomacy, mediation, referring cases to the international criminal court and 
52 Christof Royer, “Framing and Reframing R2P—a Responsibility to Protect Humanity From Evil,” Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, (2018), 3. DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2018.1479818
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the Africa court of human rights, the use of respected envoys, implementing convincing sanctions, as 
well as the condemnation of atrocities by international organizations, regional organizations, along 
with human right bodies and the media. The RtoP toolbox consists of instruments that, depending 
on the local context, non-sequentially, but often simultaneously contribute to the prevention of 
mass atrocities, the protection of civilians during ongoing conflict, and the stabilization of countries 
emerging from conflict. Structural tools to prevent react, or rebuild include the promotion of 
membership in international organizations, support of equitable development, and security sector 
reform; examples of direct tools are preventive diplomacy, criminal prosecution, and humanitarian 
engagement.53
In summary, though the application of RtoP has exposed challenges, opportunities abound 
for the doctrine in Africa and a host of other countries where human rights violations and crimes 
against humanity continue to take their toll. While it could be argued the application of RtoP, at 
present, remains divided among states and actors in the Global North and Global South, they 
do unanimously attest to the reality that crimes against humanity should not be tolerated in any 
manner. This was demonstrated by ECOWAS involvement in the Gambia issue and the continuous 
condemnation of the Syria crisis, even though the world has yet to take proactive steps towards 
civilian protection in Syria. In essence, while the application of RtoP in a host of African countries, 
as demonstrated in this study, has exposed some fundamental challenges with the doctrine, it 
should, however, not deter the international community from its future application. Well-
monitored RtoP application in terms of the use of diplomacy, envoys, sanctions, regional solutions, 
political solutions, and judicial inquiries should all be encouraged. And, in the event of the use of 
Pillar III of RtoP, such intervention must be monitored strictly, just as intervening states must also 
commit themselves to the dictates of the doctrine, the local dynamics of the conflict as well as well 
as engaging locals in resolving their conflicts is essential.
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